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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN M. RIOS, 
Petitioner/Appellant
 C a s e N Q 2 0 0 3 0 4 2 7 . C A 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the district court err when it dismissed the petition for extraordinary relief for 
lack of jurisdiction? 
"On appeal from dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief, [the Court] 
review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law supporting the dismissal for correctness." 
Miller v. State, 932 P.2d 618,620 (Utah App. 1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Steven M. Rios, a minor over sixteen years of age at the time of the 
crime, was charged by information in juvenile court under the serious youth offender 
statute. R. 11. The limited record in this case does not indicate what the charges were, 
but they necessarily included one or more of the felony violations listed in the serious 
youth offender statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(l)(a) (listing aggravated arson, 
aggravated assault involving intentionally causing serious bodily injury, aggravated 
kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated murder, and 
attempted murder).1 
On October 19, 2001, the juvenile court conducted a preliminary hearing. 
R. 10-11. The court found probable cause to believe that the crimes alleged in the three 
counts of the amended information had occurred and that petitioner had committed them. 
R. 11. The court further found that petitioner did not qualify for retention in the juvenile 
court under the retention factors set forth in the serious youth offender statute. Id. The 
juvenile court therefore ordered petitioner bound over to the district court. Id. The 
record indicates no appeal of that order. See R. 43. 
Petitioner pled guilty to forcible sodomy, a first degree felony, and attempted 
murder, a second degree felony, in the district court. R. 43. He was sentenced on July 
19, 2002. Id. He did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he attempt to 
appeal his conviction or sentence. Id. 
1
 The State has filed with this brief a motion asking this Court to strike Exhibit A, 
apparently a transcript of the preliminary hearing, and Exhibit D, apparently a transcript 
of the change of plea proceedings, and all references to them in petitioner's brief. This 
court "will not consider evidence which is not part of the record." State v. Pliego, 1999 
UT 8, U 7, 974 P.2d 279. "Additionally, although the record may be supplemented if 
anything material is omitted, it may not be done by simply including the omitted material 
in the party's addendum." Id. 
2 
Nearly five months later, on November 5, 2002, Rios filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief in the district court. R. 1. In a supporting memorandum, Rios 
claimed that "the State did not prove nor did the petitioner's attorney introduce opposing 
evidence that it is 'contrary to the best interest of the minor or of the public for the 
Juvenile Court to retain jurisdiction.'" R. 4. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(2)). 
Rios therefore claimed that his guilty plea should be set aside. R. 7. 
The State moved to transfer the matter from the Honorable William B. Bohling to 
the sentencing judge, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson. R. 24-25. The State cited rule 
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "when a petition for 
post-conviction relief is filed, 'the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge 
who sentenced the petitioner' unless such judge is unavailable." Id, (citing Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65(f) (2001)). 
Rios opposed the transfer, arguing that rule 65C did not entitle him to relief. 
R. 29. He claimed that he should never have been "certified as an adult." Id.2 
2
 The juvenile court did not certify Rios as an adult under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-603 (2002). Rather, the court bound him over to district court under the serious 
youth offender statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (2002). Under the serious youth 
offender statute, if the juvenile court finds that the State has met its burden to show 
probable cause that the minor committed a listed serious felony, the court "shall order 
that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district court" unless it finds 
by clear and convincing evidence the existence of three retention factors. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-602(3). The juvenile has "the burden of going forward and presenting 
evidence as to the existence of the [retention factors]." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-602(3)(c). 
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The State then responded, arguing that "[i]f petitioner is attempting to file a 
petition for extraordinary relief under Rule 65B(d)(2), alleging that the juvenile court 
exceeded its junsdiction or abused its discretion, then this case (no 020912230) should 
be dismissed, because petitioner Rios has filed the petition m the wrong court and has 
named an incorrect respondent." R. 36. The State continued, "A petitioner filing a 
petition for extraordinary relief alleging that an inferior court or officer has exceeded its 
junsdiction or abused its discretion, must file the petition in a superior court The distnct 
court is not a supenor court to the juvenile court." Id (emphasis in onginal) (citing Utah 
Code Ann § 78-3-4 (junsdiction of the distnct court), § 78-3a-104 (junsdiction of the 
juvenile court), § 78-3a-l05 (concurrent junsdiction), and § 78-3a-909 (appeals)). The 
State concluded, "When a juvenile is ordered held for tnal in the distnct court, that is a 
final, appealable order, which is appealed not to the distnct court but to the Court of 
Appeals." Id. (citing M.C v. State, 916 P.2d 914 (Utah App. 1996); Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3a-909(l)). 
The State explained that Rios had not only filed his petition in the wrong court, but 
had also named the wrong respondent. While the office of the Utah Attorney General 
''represents the State of Utah when it is named as the respondent in a Rule 65C petition 
for post-conviction relief/' it "does not represent the courts or the judges when they are 
named as respondents in extraordinary wnts." R. 37. 
On Apnl 9, 2003, the district court filed its written order dismissing the petition 
for extraordinary relief based upon its lack of junsdiction. R. 42-47 The court stated, 
''Petitioner essentially asks this Court to review the decision made by the Juvenile Court 
4 
to transfer petitioner's case from Juvenile Court to Adult Court. However, in Utah, 
District Courts do not have jurisdiction over Juvenile Courts." R. 43. 
On May 6, 2003, Rios appealed the order of dismissal. R. 48. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The limited record on appeal includes little information about the criminal episode 
underlying Rios' convictions. The record indicates that Rios had been removed from his 
home and placed in Genesis, a community work program, had been "allowed off-site," 
had escaped from the Genesis program, and was an escapee at the time of the crime. 
R. 3-4, 11. The record also suggests that the victim's injuries were serious, as the 
juvenile court ordered that Rios' supervisors at Genesis view the photographs of the 
victim. R. 11. Further, although the record contains little information about the criminal 
episode, the serious nature of the incident can be inferred from defendant's guilty plea to 
forcible sodomy and attempted murder. See R. 43. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly dismissed Rios' petition for extraordinary relief under 
rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule permits a court of superior jurisdiction 
to grant relief from an inferior court's wrongful use of judicial authority. The district 
court is not a court superior to the juvenile court, and it therefore had no jurisdiction to 
grant the extraordinary relief Rios sought. Moreover, Rios was not entitled to relief 
under the act because he had another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
Rios sought a writ for extraordinary relief in the district court, asking that court for 
a determination that the juvenile court had erred or abused its discretion when, following 
the preliminary hearing, it transferred the underlying criminal case to the district court 
pursuant to the serious youth offender statute. The district court properly dismissed Rios' 
petition. The district court had no jurisdiction to review the order of the juvenile court. 
Rios should have directed his petition to this Court, a court superior to the juvenile court. 
He should have named the district court judge, not the State, as a respondent. 
But, even had Rios filed his petition in the proper court, he could not have 
prevailed. Petitions for extraordinary relief are governed by rule 65B of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 65B, extraordinary relief is only available where no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available. The juvenile court's bindover order was 
a final appealable order. Rios could have filed a timely appeal from that order, but did 
not. 
A. Rule 65B governs petitions for extraordinary relief. 
Rule 65B governs petitions for extraordinary relief. Osborne v. Adoption Center 
of Choice, 2003 UT 15, f 26, 70 P.3d 58. Where the petition claims the wrongful use of 
judicial authority, the petitioner must show that "an inferior court,. . . has exceeded its 
jurisdiction or abused its authority," "an inferior court,. . . has failed to perform an act 
required by law," or "an inferior court,. . . has refused the petitioner enjoyment of a 
6 
right. . . to which the petitioner is entitled." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2). Moreover, 
extraordinary relief is available only "[wjhere no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). 
B. The district court properly determined that it had no jurisdiction to address 
Rios' petition for extraordinary relief. 
Rios filed a petition in the district court for a writ of extraordinary relief under rule 
65B(d), which permits an aggrieved person to petition the court to grant appropriate relief 
"where an inferior court. . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2); see R. 1; Br. Appellant at 12. Rios claimed that the juvenile court 
"was not aware of the serious mental difficulties afflicting the petitioner" and therefore 
had abused its discretion when it transferred the criminal case to the district court. 
R. 4-5. 
As stated, a court may grant extraordinary relief under rule 65B(d)(2) where an 
"inferior court . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion" (emphasis 
added). The district court had no jurisdiction to hear Rios's appeal because the juvenile 
court is not a court inferior to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (2000) 
(jurisdiction of the district court), § 78-3a-104 (Supp. 2003) (jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court), § 78-3a-105 (Supp. 2003) (concurrent jurisdiction of district court and juvenile 
court), § 78-3a-909 (2002) (appeals). Under statutory law, appeals from the juvenile 
courts are taken to the court of appeals, not to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(c) (2001) (stating that "Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction . . . over . . . appeals from the juvenile courts"); § 78-3a-909(l) ("An appeal 
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to the Court of Appeals may be taken from any order, decree, or judgment of the juvenile 
court."); A/.C. v. State, 916 P.2d 914, 918 (concluding that transfer order terminating 
juvenile court's jurisdiction is a final order appealable to the court of appeals, not to the 
district court). The district court therefore had no jurisdiction under rule 65B to grant 
extraordinary relief from any act of the juvenile court. Specifically, it had no jurisdiction 
to review or grant relief from the juvenile court's bindover and transfer of the case. See 
State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, f 23, 62 P.3d 444; M.C v. State, 916 P.2d at 918. 
C. Because Rios had another remedy he would not have been entitled to 
extraordinary relief, even had he filed his petition in the proper court. 
In any event, Rios is not entitled to relief under rule 65B because, by its terms, a 
petitioner is entitled to extraordinary relief only "[wjhere no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a); see also Osborne, 2003 UT 15, 
f 24; Renn v.Utah Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995). "Extraordinary writs 
were not intended to be used as substitutes for appeal or to circumvent the formalities 
required for an appeal." Wilde v. Third Circuit Court, 655 P.2d 674, 674 (Utah 1982); 
see also Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972) (writ of mandamus is 
"not a substitute for and cannot be used in civil proceedings to serve the purpose of 
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error"). Utah courts have consistently held that extraordinary 
relief is precluded where a party simply fails to exercise his right to appeal a final order. 
See, e.g., Merrihew v. Salt Lake Co. Planning & Zoning Comm >*, 659 P.2d 1065, 1066-
67 (Utah 1983) ("By ignoring a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law [an appeal], 
the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus"); 
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Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678, 679-80 (Utah 1982) (plaintiffs who 
did not exercise right to appeal district court's adverse ruling could not substitute that 
"plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law" with petition for extraordinary relief); State 
v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah App. 1998) (recognizing that writs of mandamus are 
not a substitute for and cannot be used to serve purpose of appeal). 
Rios' only claim is that the juvenile court improperly transferred his criminal case 
to the district court. The order binding Rios over to the district court was a final 
appealable order. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, H 23 (citing M.C. v. State, 916 P.2d at 916). 
If Rios believed that the order was erroneous, he could and should have filed a timely 
appeal of that order. He did not. Rather, he never challenged the juvenile court's transfer 
order. Instead, he negotiated a plea agreement in district court. 
In short, even assuming that the district court had jurisdiction over Rios' petition 
for extraordinary relief, Rios was not entitled to relief under rule 65B because he had 
another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). 
CONCLUSION 
This district court lacked jurisdiction to review the bindover order of the juvenile 
court. In any event, Rios was not entitled to relief under rule 65B because he had another 
remedy. This court should affirm the district court's dismissal of the petition for 
extraordinary relief. 
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